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Households in rural Colombia are confronted with 
a variety of violent threats: attacks and displacement 
threats by guerrillas and paramilitaries, gang violence 
among drug traffickers, and high common delinquency. 
In this context, households have to adjust their day-to-
day decisions, including saving and portfolio choices, 
in order to be less vulnerable. The authors test the 
hypothesis that households, when confronted with 
exogenous violence, reduce their investment and, 
moreover, shift it from fixed to mobile assets, which 
This paper—a product of the Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand the impact of violence on household decisions. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at rgrun@worldbank.org.  
would be safer in the case of displacement, and choose 
the opposite strategy under higher common delinquency 
associated with property crimes. Empirical evidence from 
a rich Colombian micro-data set strongly supports the 
hypothesis. The results shed new light on the economic 
impact of violence. The immediate reduction in capital 
stock might be much less severe than more permanent 
damage via the savings function. This has implications 
for the appropriate political answer to chronic violence in 
Colombia as well as in other areas of chronic conflict.Household Investment under Violence – The 
Colombian Case 
Rebekka E. Grun1 
 
Households in rural Colombia are confronted with a variety of violent threats: attacks and displacement threats by 
guerrillas and paramilitaries, gang violence among drug traffickers, and high common delinquency. In this context, 
households have to adjust their day-to-day decisions, including saving and portfolio choices, in order to be less 
vulnerable. The authors test the hypothesis that households, when confronted with exogenous violence, reduce their 
investment and, moreover, shift it from fixed to mobile assets, which would be safer in the case of displacement, and 
choose the opposite strategy under higher common delinquency associated with property crimes. Empirical evidence 
from a rich Colombian micro-data set strongly supports the hypothesis. The results shed new light on the economic 
impact of violence. The immediate reduction in capital stock might be much less severe than more permanent 
damage via the savings function. This has implications for the appropriate political answer to chronic violence in 
Colombia as well as in other areas of chronic conflict.  
INTRODUCTION 
Many households in the developing world live in a chronically violent context. They have 
to adjust their decisions, from consumption and savings to family planning, to the daily 
risks of violence. A household confronted with chronic violent threats is economically 
more exposed than a household in a non-violent context. And different household assets 
are exposed differently. In the case of flight, heavy animals and furniture would have to 
be left behind, while easily mobile assets such as bicycles, jewellery and transportable 
household goods could be carried to a secure place. On the other hand, they could be 
stolen more easily as well. In other words, the household’s assets and their returns are 
threatened, albeit to different degrees, and possibly by different kinds of violence. It is 
conceivable that a utility-maximizing household would re-optimize its investment 
compared to a peaceful situation, depending on the threats and their size.  
                                                 
1 I thank Costas Meghir, Orazio Attanasio, Tim Besley, Jerome Adda, Ian Preston, Christian Dustmann, Richard 
Disney, Heski Bar-Isaac, Cloda Jenkins, James Harvey, Alice Mesnard, Thorsten Vogel, Emma Aguila, Miguel 
Fogel, an participants at a seminar at UCL and at the EEA conference in Madrid for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. All errors are my own.                                                                                                                                                                    O.A.M.D.G.  
This paper examines the reaction of a household’s portfolio to violence. It explores 
whether the differing robustness of assets to different kinds of violence plays a role in a 
household’s portfolio decision. We want to examine for example whether the balance 
between fixed and likely less productive mobile assets shifts towards the latter in the 
presence of some kinds of violence, and towards the former for others. If yes, this would 
have implications for the discussion about violence. A change in household saving 
behavior in the form of a decline in total savings and a shift of the remaining savings 
towards less productive assets would constitute longer-term damage to the economy; i.e. 
a greater loss than the immediate measurable decline in the destroyed capital stock, which 
is often cited in the literature and discussed in the context of the Solow or related macro-
models.
2 From a Solow perspective, a sustained downward shift in the savings rate would 
lower the steady state of the economy, whereas a loss in the capital stock would only be 
temporary, as savings could ‘fill the gap’. 
The economic literature has so far paid little attention to the impact of violence, 
especially in relation to household investment. Stewart and Venieris (1985) are the first to 
study the reaction of aggregate savings to socio-political instability. The authors use 
Sandmo’s (1969) two-asset model to illustrate the effect of greater instability. Political 
instability is assumed to increase the perceived risk and to lower the future expected 
income and the expected value of the return from risky assets. As a consequence, 
domestic savings (i.e. the savings subject to instability) decline. The authors confirm their 
hypothesis from 1960s macro data. They do not examine the relative behavior of 
domestic and foreign assets or the consistency with individual level data. Bohn and 
Deacon (2001) show with macro-data that violence, via ownership risk, can lower 
                                                 
2   ‘Modelling the impact of war in the Solow model’ seems to be a preferred undergrad topic, compare for 
example www.glue.umd.ed/~mjpries or faculty.tcu.edu/jlovett/int_macro/exams. Also consider Brück (1997) 
who shows the destruction of capital stock as the most obvious cost of war. 
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investment in natural resources. Indeed, the threat of violence as we discuss it above can 
also be interpreted as limited enforcement of ownership rights. In this sense, the 
theoretical content of the literature examining the impact of property rights on 
investment, from Demsetz (1967) to e.g. Besley (1995a) and McMillan et al. (2002), all of 
which find a positive link between secure property rights and investment at the micro-
level, is applicable to our question and can offer predictions about the possible impact of 
violence. Finally, Echeverry et al. (2001) provide a comprehensive brainstorming of 
various ways in which violence may hamper capital accumulation, including skewing 
portfolios towards less productive assets.  
The literature still leaves significant space to breach. Among the above there is a virtual 
absence of papers analyzing within-country variation. Most empirical studies are cross-
country and therefore susceptible to omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Further, very 
few papers have looked at portfolio composition. Thus this paper is novel in various 
ways. First, it uses a unique Colombian micro-level dataset to examine the impact of 
violence on savings. Second, it analyzes the reaction of portfolio composition rather than 
absolute assets to violence.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the next section (2) gives some 
background on the history and types of violence present in Colombia, section 3 explains 
the conceptual framework, section 4 discusses the dataset in the context of this 
framework, section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 
Colombia has long battled with exceptionally high levels of various kinds of violence. 
Leftwing guerrilla movements, mainly the ELN (National Liberation Army) and FARC 
(Red Armed Forces of Colombia) have gathered strength since the mid 1980s and 
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experienced a veritable power surge in the early 1990s, when they took over part of the 
cocaine production after the police dismantled two major drug cartels. With this new 
source of finance, they have been able to attack communities and take over territory in 
various regions of the country, where they are now engaged in a civil war with the 
government army. At the same time, various rightwing paramilitary forces, united under 
the umbrella of AUC (United Auto-Defenses of Colombia) fight the guerrillas and 
anybody whom they suspect of collaboration. Paramilitaries, and to a slightly lesser 
extent the guerrillas, use displacement threats to civilians (in order to occupy corridors 
for drug and arms transport), as well as kidnappings and armed encounters with 
government forces to further their cause. 
Moreover, despite the virtual dismantling of the two major drug cartels, various drug 
gangs are active throughout the country and engaged in gang wars, the externalities of 
which often affect civilians; especially as the smaller gangs are fairly widely diffused 
throughout the country. Also, the legal effort necessary to deal with a large amount of 
drug trafficking has congested law enforcement institutions and contributed to the 
dissemination of criminal know-how.
3 
As a result of the above, Colombia reports fairly high levels of common delinquency. 
The homicide rate is three times higher than in Brazil or Mexico, and ten times higher 
than in the US; the kidnapping rate is highest in the world.
4 Also, as Sanchez et al (2003) 
find, an attack by the guerrillas or paramilitaries on a community often precedes a general 
rise in common delinquency, so generally higher levels of crime are partially a by-product 
of the armed conflict. 
                                                 
3   Gaviria and Velez (2001), Gaviria (1998), Gaitan (1995), Fajnzyöber et al. (1999) 
4   60% of kidnappings in the World take place in Colombia, see Gaviria and Velez (2001). 
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This violence can largely be assumed exogenous to the individual household. Most 
analyses into the origin of violence in Colombia find that the strongest predictors are 
hysteresis and spatial dependence, weaknesses of the justice system and the development 
of the drug trade.
 5  Armed activities are further facilitated by a difficult geography, such 
as high altitudes or dense forests, to the extent that this restricts the access of the state.
6   
There seems to be a weak role at best for poverty, inequality and social exclusion, at least 
in the current situation. Sanchez and Nunez (2001), with data from the 1980s and 1990s, 
find all three of these factors explain only a small fraction of the homicide rate, Medina 
and Martinez (2001), using data from the 1990s, find a weak role for poverty but none 
for inequality, Fajnzylber et al. (1999), using data since the 1970s, find one for inequality 
but none for poverty. Bourguignon et al. (2003), with data from the 1980s and 1990s, 
show that only a certain fraction of the income distribution, namely the percentage of 
people below 80% of mean income, is related to property crime. Rubio (2000a), 
analyzing a cross-section of Colombian municipalities for different yearly intervals since 
1987, shows that traditionally important determinants of guerrilla presence at the 
community level, such as inequality, wealth and education, lose their explanatory power 
during the 1990s.  
There is however some evidence of victimization patterns. Moser (1999) states that 
younger, lower income and less educated men are more at risk of being both victims and 
perpetrators of homicides, while women and their dependent children are most affected 
by forced displacement.  
The analysis in this paper takes account of the different types of violence present in 
Colombia as far as available data allows. We record the incidence of a so-called public 
                                                 
5   Levitt and Rubio (2000), Sanchez et al (2003), Sanchez and Nunez (2001). 
6   Vargas, Restrepo and Spagat (2004) 
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order problem (guerrillas or paramilitaries present in a municipality), number of guerrilla 
attacks, and the homicide rate. Our conceptual framework (next section) follows this 
situation and classifies the different kinds of violence into two generic kinds: public order 
problems (guerrilla or paramilitaries and their activity - with an explicit mandate against 
the current public order), and common delinquency (gang violence without a mandate 
against the state).  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A household suddenly confronted with violence is prompted to reconsider its 
consumption and savings decisions. Violence can erode saved assets and threaten or 
lower future returns. Other things equal, this is likely to lower the household’s propensity 
to save.
7 If saving is spread across different assets, more threatened assets should receive 
less investment than less exposed ones. This exposure may well depend on the kind of 
asset and the kind of violence. In an attempt to do justice to the Colombian context we 
distinguish two kinds of violence: first, violence against the public order, typically by 
guerrillas or paramilitaries, which is directed at the state, and manifests itself through 
attacks on infrastructure, displacement threats and kidnapping, and second, common 
delinquency, without a political mandate, carried out by local street gangs, manifest in 
muggings, looting and homicides to ensure success or to adjust accounts. Consequently 
fixed assets should be more exposed to public order problems, which threaten with 
displacement, whereas mobile assets, which can be carried away, are likely more affected 
by the looting and mugging of common delinquents.  
                                                 
7   However, violence can also have the opposite effect: it can be perceived as an increase in risk   which would 
increase saving through the precautionary motive. 
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In order to illustrate the effects of violence on portfolio choice we choose a simple two-
asset model. For the sake of simplicity we assume the returns of our two assets are 
independent in the absence of violence. Our representative individual is risk averse and 
lives over two periods. She receives a constant exogenous income y in the first period 
and can split it between consumption and investment into fixed and mobile assets, so 
that c = y – f – m. Fixed investment from period 1 earns a return R with probability pf or 
stays with the original worth with a probability (1-pf). Mobile assets are also risky, earning 
return P with probability pm.
8 As indicated before, we assume R>P, and pm >pf in peace.
 9 
Assuming a time preference rate of γ  and intertemporally separable utility with CARA 
and elasticity of substitution 
σ
1


































































m f m f
m f m f
 
The FOC for f and m are symmetrical in the peaceful state and read 
0
) (






































m f y f
U m f f m m f m f  
0
) (






































m f y m
U m f f m m f m f  
                                                 
8   For the sake of simplicity we refrain from modelling a wider variety of returns. 
9   Note that the model is ‘autarkic’ in the sense of Besley (1995b), i.e. we abstract from financial intermediators. 
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We can explore these FOC with comparative statics based on the Implicit Function 
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which is > 0 for   and  . Therefore,  >0, f* reacts positively to income. 
Obviously, the same result applies symmetrically for  . - Note that a lower elasticity of 
substitution would dampen the effect. 
0 ≥ m 0 ≥ f ) ( *' y f
* m
Violence may disturb optimal investment in a variety of ways. We assume violence will 
primarily diminish the expected returns by making failure more likely, with the two kinds 
of violence affecting returns in different ways. Displacement threats would make the 
ownership of fixed assets more insecure. Further, the explicit aim to weaken the presence 
of the state may entail a general loss of law and order and thereby reduce the security of 
market transactions, necessary for entrepreneurial activity. – We assume violence against 
the public order threatens y. On the other hand, common delinquency is assumed to be a 
threat to the returns of mobile assets primarily, as these can be stolen and carried away. 
In line with our discussion above, we assume violence against public order to lower y 
and  but to leave the return and success probability for the mobile asset intact.   f p
   8                                                                                                                                                                   O.A.M.D.G.  
We have examined the reaction of assets to y before. A reduction in y would clearly 
reduce both f* and m . In order to explore the reaction of f* to  , we again use the 























− = ) ( *'  



















σ σ σ σ γ
) (
) 1 (
) ( ) (
) 1 (










m m m m
f
f  
which is >0 for   and  (compare the position of R in the numerator and 
denominator of the two positive terms). Therefore,  >0 and a reduction in   
will reduce the optimal demand for the fixed asset.
0 ≥ m 0 ≥ f
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10 In the same way, the optimal 
demand for m* can be shown to increase with a reduction in  . Combining these two 
effects, an increase in guerrilla violence (i.e. a decrease in  ) will augment the share of 
the mobile asset in the overall portfolio. The same argument applies symmetrically for 
common delinquency, if we assume it to threaten returns on mobile assets. Mobile 
investments are predicted to decrease with higher common delinquency, whereas fixed 
asset investments become more popular.  
f
In the remainder of this paper, we want to test the predictions of the above model 
empirically. This will entail exploring the extent of fixed and mobile investments as 
functions of anti public order and delinquent violence, as well as of income, and other 
municipal and individual variables that are likely to influence the cost or return of 
different investments. In this context it will be particularly important to control for all 
 
10   Again, note that a lower elasticity of substitution (i.e. a higher σ ) dampens the effect of a movement in  .  f p
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factors that may influence the occurrence of violence, in order to avoid the violence 
variable picking up the effect of other, correlated, features.  
DATA 
The main dataset used comes from the baseline survey to evaluate the Familias en Acción 
program in Colombia (‘Familias dataset’), conducted in 2002 with approximately 11,500 
households in 122 municipalities. Two types of surveys were applied: an extensive 
questionnaire for households of the lowest income stratum (i.e. registered with ‘SISBEN 
1’
11 in December 1999) and a questionnaire to the mayor in order to obtain municipality 
level variables.
12 We merge this dataset at the municipal level with two further databases, 
a violence database assembled by Medina et al. (2001), and a database of municipality 
characteristics compiled from different official sources, like the Colombian Institute for 
Family Welfare (ICBF), the Planning Ministry (DNP), and the Administration of Courts 
(CSJ).  
The municipalities in the violence dataset do not completely match those in the Familias 
dataset, so that close to 3,000 household observations are lost through matching. 
Familias, while covering households in the lowest national welfare stratum near 
exhaustively, does not reach all municipalities. And the violence database misses the 
departments of Antioquia, Choco and Guajira, which are nonetheless included in 
Familias. Please note that our results will therefore only have external validity for the 
lowest national welfare stratum in the area excluding the above departments. While 
excluding Choco and Guajira should not have a noticeable effect on the average and 
median prevalence of violence in the sample, excluding Antioquia may miss the upper 
                                                 
11   SISBEN 1-6, sixtiles of the population income distribution, is a basic welfare indicator routinely collected for 
all families in Colombia. Its level determines welfare entitlements and utility prices. 
12   Familias covers the first income sixtile exhaustively. It is therefore not representative for Colombia as a whole, 
but covers the poorest households in their entirety. 
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limit of common delinquent activity. However, we still prefer this violence dataset, 
assembled by Colombian violence historians and economists, to geographically more 
complete official sources, because it contains vital control variables, such as the rate of 
captures under the drug act by the police. 
Household level variables from the Familias survey cover day-to-day decision-making, the 
socio-economics of members and consumption information. The dataset also covers 
whether and how many family members have left the municipality. It also covers the 
political activity of the household expressed as membership in groups such as parties, 
religious groups, pro-peace and other groups.   
At the municipality level, we chiefly have two sets of variables: violence variables, which 
are discussed in more detail in the next section, and other municipality characteristics, 
some of which may facilitate violence. Here, the empirical literature on Colombia has 
pointed to geography, judicial efficiency and welfare, respectively. Regarding geography, 
from Familias we obtain the altitude in meters, a dummy for three different degrees of 
rurality and a dummy for one of four regions. In our context, geography is important for 
two reasons. First, a municipality with difficult physical access will naturally enjoy less 
governmental protection against armed groups such as guerrillas and paramilitaries 
(compare Vargas, Restrepo and Spagat (2004) and Reynal-Querol (2005)). Access in 
Colombia can be difficult through dispersion of settlement (rurality), 
rainforest/mangrove swamps (Pacific region), or mountainous terrain (intermediate to 
high altitudes).  Second, coca plants, a major source of income for the armed groups as 
well as common delinquents, are best planted in certain areas. While the actual 
plantations are endogenous to the protection by armed groups, the geography apt to 
their cultivation, i.e. Andean altitudes between 1,000 and 2,000m, is exogenous. 
Regarding judicial efficiency, our municipal database contains the arrests under the Drug 
   11                                                                                                                                                                   O.A.M.D.G.  
Act per million inhabitants. This is related to both the incidence of drug crime and police 
efficiency. Previous studies, e.g. Martinez, Medina and Steiner (2001) and Martinez and 
Medina (2003) use arrests under the Drug Act as a proxy of local law and order 
enforcement. Regarding welfare and wealth, the database provides the official Indicator 
for Quality of Life. This indicator combines different variables about access to services. 
The dataset further covers the sum of assets held by banks in the municipality, as 
recorded by Financial Regulation. Finally, we can approximate inequality through the 
percentage of people in the two lowest income strata, in line with Bourguignon (2003).  
Measuring violence  
As the introduction showed, the country is suffering from various kinds of violence. 
These can roughly be divided into first, violence that explicitly challenges the state, such 
as that proceeding from the guerrillas and paramilitaries, and second, common 
delinquency, proceeding from organized small gangs and unorganized crime. (A third 
force, drug cartels, in their original form belong largely to the past, since the Cali and 
Medellin cartels have been dismantled and much of the drug business has been picked up 
by both guerrillas and paramilitaries, and smaller fractionalized gangs.) 
As mentioned before, the perpetrators of the two kinds of violence use different means. 
Guerrillas and paramilitaries rely on displacement threats, kidnappings, extortion, 
massacres, and combat, the common delinquents prefer muggings, carjacking, and 
vendettas to adjust accounts, mostly among themselves. Not all of this violence is 
officially, let alone exhaustively, measured.
13 Regarding violence challenging the state, 
                                                 
13   Because of this there have been efforts to measure the actions of the armed groups more precisely. Vargas, 
Restrepo and Spagat (2004) have recently put together a dataset of guerrilla, paramilitary and other militia 
actions and their victims, carefully handpicking from NGO and church databases and local press articles. 
However, their database relies on the judgment of the authors, and for example consciously leaves out armed 
encounters that cannot be attributed to actors in the armed conflict. We therefore prefer to rely on Medina et 
al. (2001). 
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data assembled by the Medina et al. (2001) from National Police records and other 
municipal data allows us to measure guerrilla attacks directly. Through a ‘public order 
problem’ dummy in the Familias survey, we also pick up qualitatively whether 
paramilitaries or guerrillas are at all present in a municipality. To our knowledge, there is 
currently no source that quantifies the degree of paramilitary actions reliably. But also the 
official statistics can be challenged, as the National Police records only actions they have 
been notified of, which might not always be the case.
 14 Regarding common delinquency, 
our data sources pick up the homicide rate. There are obviously further activities by the 
perpetrators of homicides, such as muggings, and some of these will be committed in 
conjunction with a homicide. But of the available statistics, homicides are the most 
reliable, as they are certified and tracked by the Forensic Medecine (Medicina Legal)
15. 
All other indicators of common delinquency are likely to be strongly under-reported. 
From the above, we can detect two issues that will affect the interpretation of our 
empirical results. First, the uncertain measurement of some violence variables may entail 
an attenuation effect on the corresponding covariates. Second, as we possibly do not pick 
up all relevant variables, such as muggings, there will likely be some Omitted Variable 
Bias in the coefficient of the homicide rate. - In the light of this, let us examine the 
variation and correlation of the observed violence variables. 
According to our data, the incidence of the different types of violence is high. All 
municipalities reporting data experience arrests under the Drug Act, varying from 29 per 
million to over 1,500 per million. About 75% of the households live in municipalities 
                                                 
14    For example, National Police statistics on paramilitaries appear less complete than for guerrillas; and the 
overwhelming majority of empirical studies on Colombia relies on guerrilla and homicide figures alone. Also, 
as the paramilitaries avoid combat situations, they have fewer encounters with the police, and are less likely to 
be tracked, compare Vargas et al (2004).  
15   Levitt and Rubio (2000) for example consider only the homicide rate a reliable violence indicator in Colombia. 
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with a guerrilla or paramilitary militia present, and 40% experience guerrilla attacks. More 
than 80% live in municipalities with a measurable homicide rate.  
From the definition of our variables we know that the measurement of the homicide rate 
and guerrilla attacks must overlap: some guerrilla actions result in deaths. Indeed, 
although the correlations appear quite low, we detect some link between a public-order 
problem or guerrilla attacks on the one hand and the homicide rate on the other hand, 
see Table 1. Nonetheless, the literature agrees
16 that most of the homicides are not a 
product of the armed conflict, but rather of common delinquency. If we observe a 
certain correlation, it probably reflects the findings of Sanchez, Diaz and Formisano 
(2003) that a first-time guerrilla strike in an area is subsequently followed by an increase 
in common delinquency. This is consistent with guerrilla type violence eroding law and 
order, and creating a climate with a greater propensity for common delinquency. 
It is worth pointing out that the capture rate is negatively associated to all other violence 
measures, which suggests that it might be a good indicator of police responsiveness. As 
mentioned previously, both the armed groups and the common delinquency derive 
income from the drug trade and are therefore indirectly a target of the Drug Act
17.  Note 
that our database measures the capture rate at departmental level (more aggregate), but 
violence at municipal level, which provides some control for potential endogeneity of the 
capture rate to violence. 
 
 
                                                 
16   See Moser (1999) for an overview, and Vargas, Restrepo and Spagat (2004). The Ministry of Defence believes 
as much as 80% of homicides have nothing to do with the guerrilla, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (2001) 
17   Also see Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) for evidence of the reaction of violence to deterrence in 
Colombia. 
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problem  1          
Guerrilla attack rate  0.16  1         
Homicide rate  0.24  0.43  1       
Capture rate  -0.09  -0.17  -0.12  1     
People in 2 lowest 
income strata (%)  0.28 0.28  0.11  -0.19  1   
Quality of Life Index  -0.31 -0.15  -0.10  0.31  -0.40  1
Table 1: Correlation matrix of violence and welfare 
We also assess to what extent violence is linked to other community characteristics.   
Table 1 shows that correlations between welfare and violence indicators are small, but 
significantly different from zero and with signs as expected. There may be a weak 
positive link between inequality and violence, and a negative one between Quality of Life 
and violence. Likewise, better access to basic services (measured in the Quality of Life 
indicator) goes hand in hand with a higher capture rate.  
Measuring household assets 
Household variables from the Familias survey cover ownership of assets such as house, 
land, animals, household goods and vehicles. The survey only asks whether a certain 
asset is owned, not how much it is worth. We have therefore additionally collected prices 
for the assets in question through a survey among people belonging to the three lowest 
income sixtiles (SISBEN 1-3) in a rural province near Bogotá (Boyacá). These prices are 
estimates and not representative, but constitute a useful approximation in the absence of 
official price statistics.  
We divide the surveyed range of household assets into fixed, i.e. impossible or difficult to 
move, and mobile assets. Empirically, more than 2/3 of displaced people flee more than 
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50km, mostly using existing transport provision, such as buses.
18 The goods left behind 
or carried on the flight vary by family and distance, but the usual choice is consistent 
with our classification into fixed and mobile. Often, a flight consists of various stages and 
also the mobile assets are sold at later stages. But at the first stage, and in most families’ 
expectation
19, the following goods can be considered fixed and mobile respectively, as 
Table 2 shows. 
Fixed Assets  Mobile Assets 
house  manual sewing machine 
other real estate  stereo equipment 
fridge fan 
TV mixer 
boat/canoe kerosene  lamp 
diesel generator  bicycle 
horses motorcycle 
cows chicken 
donkeys rabbits   
pigs ducks 
goats    
sheep    
Table 2: Definition (1) of 
fixed and mobile assets 
 
Source: based on 
Econometría (2003) 
The definition of fixed and mobile may differ in different environments, and according to 
the means of transport. Therefore we will test the sensitivity of our empirical results with 
another, more basic, definition, as laid out in Table 3. 
                                                 
18   See Econometría (2003). 
19   Compare Econometría (2003). 
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Fixed Assets  Mobile Assets 
house  manual sewing machine 
other real estate  stereo equipment 
fridge fan 
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  donkeys 
  pigs 
  goats 
  chicken 
  rabbits  
  ducks 
Table 3: Definition (2) of 
fixed and mobile assets 
Information about ownership is not enough to estimate valued demand functions. For 
our empirical analysis, we therefore value the assets with the prices listed in Table 4. 
                                                 
20   Note that the diesel generators used in Colombia, so-called ‘plantas’, are typically portable generators as for 
example made by Honda.  
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kerosene lamp  17 
manual sewing machine  44 
mixer 14 
motorcycle 2,271 
average piece of land for a house
21




stereo equipment  70 
television b/w  17 
television colour  157 
Table 4: Prices used for 
the valuation of assets 
 
Source: Survey of people 
of SISBEN 1-3 in rural 
Boyacá 
Note: the Familias 
database contains already 
house values as well as 
information about whether 
a TV is b/w or colour. 
                                                 
21 The familias dataset contains the actual house value, so no external average prices have to be applied here. 
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Apart from assets, the Familias dataset also reports two kinds of debt held by the 
households: mortgages and cash debt. Only 244 households report a mortgage, ranging 
in size from 22,300 to 35m COP, but 7,496 households hold cash debts, ranging from 
2,800 to 48m COP, with an average of 544,000 COP. Summing up assets and debt, 
households in our sample hold on average around 4.5m COP of net assets, or around 
2,200USD, which corresponds to 37 months of salary. Estimated wealth
22 varies widely, 
however, from a 28m COP debt to net assets of 463m COP. A scatter plot relating 








































10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
age of household head
 
Figure 1: Asset holdings and age 
If we explore the two asset classes, fixed and mobile, apart, another interesting 
relationship emerges. Table 5 and Table 6 show participation in fixed and mobile assets 
                                                 
22   We estimate asset holdings by multiplying the different assets, both fixed and mobile, with their respective 
prices and summing up, deducting any reported debt. 
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with and without a public order problem (guerrilla or paramilitary presence) for asset 
definition (1). 
  Participation in mobile assets  Total 
Participation in fixed assets  no  yes   
no 2%  3%  5% 
yes 4%  92%  95% 
Total 5%  95%  100% 
Table 5: Fixed and mobile asset holdings without guerrilla/paramilitary presence 
 
  Participation in mobile assets  Total 
Participation in fixed assets  no  yes   
no 3%  3%  6% 
yes 4%  90%  94% 
Total 7%  93%  100% 
Table 6: Fixed and mobile asset holdings with guerrilla/paramilitary presence 
We observe that very few people do not hold either asset at all. An analysis of 
participation only detects the movement of investment at the very poorest fringe of the 
population.  Note that holdings of both assets go down in the presence of 
guerrillas/paras. However, the single participations in fixed or mobile assets respectively 
do not seem to change much. A multivariate analysis is needed to shed light on the 
relationship. 
Sample selection issues 
There may be issues of sample selection in the database we use for our analysis. As 
explained earlier, we use the 2001 Familias survey as the backbone for our analysis and 
merge it at the municipality level with violence and municipal variables, also from 2001. 
The households in the Familias  survey have been identified from the government’s 
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register for the lowest income stratum (the so-called SISBEN register, last updated with 
the 1993 census). When confirming the addresses of the around 20,000 households in 
the SISBEN database, the surveyors found that nearly 40% had left their municipality. It 
is not likely that these 40% left at random. We need to test the assumption that the 
leavers censored the sample we ultimately use. In other words, we observe a sample of 
‘stayers’ in municipalities that experienced (potentially systematic) displacement already. 
The reduced sample may be different from the original sample censored by out-
migration, and display a stratification that is not representative. Therefore, our regression 
results may be different than with a complete sample. Likewise, peaceful locations will 
have experienced immigration of people marked by violence elsewhere.
23 Therefore, 
controlling for violence at the municipality level, rather than the personal history level 
may also bias our results. 
There are various ways to remedy the bias in the empirical specification, depending on 
the specification used. If the specification is linear, and the selection process from the 
original sample is known, the standard remedy is Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure. 
This involves calculating the non-selection hazard (inverse Mills ratios) in a first step, and 
including the ratio in the principal regression in a second step. The basic Heckman 






































































where   if   otherwise;   if   otherwise. 
*
t t y y = 0 ; 0
* = > t t y z 1 = t z 0 ; 0
* = > t t z z
                                                 
23    In this context, the findings of Glaeser and Shapiro (2001) are interesting, which suggest that (terrorist) 
violence shapes the choice of settlement form, e.g. a dense urban setting allows more mutual protection and 
short transport times. In this sense the fairly urban structure of our sample (50% urban settlers) is likely to 
have been shaped by years of violence. 
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The first equation is the main regression we want to analyze from our dataset and the 
second equation models the process by which data get selected into (or out of) our 
dataset. The selectivity problem arises when u  and   are correlated. In other words, 
when people’s observed behavior depends on how they have been selected into the 
sample. For example, it could be that stayers are more conservative generally and 
therefore save more and invest more in traditional assets. Equally, it could be that stayers 
are generally not very impressed by violence and therefore adjust their investment 
decisions to violence in a way that is different from leavers. 
v
If we allow   and   to be correlated we can derive an expression that helps us to correct 
























 is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). 
Note that for identification, selection needs to be driven by at least one variable not 
present in the main equation (exclusion restriction). Further, the principal specification 
needs to be linear. If the specification is non-linear, there are other remedies available 
from the literature. Boyes, Hoffman and Low (1989) and Greene (1992) offer a remedy 
for the bi-variate probit model. They deal with the non-random stratification of the 
selected sample by applying a weighted exogenous sample ML estimator. The weights, 
which are those present in the original population, are then used to adjust the selected 
sample to the ‘true’ proportions. This procedure can be extended to a Tobit 
specification. Greene (1997) offers a procedure for sample selection correction if the 
principal specification is a Tobit model. However, given that often a Tobit can be 
approximated by OLS, see Greene (2001), in most cases it will be more practicable to use 
a linear specification and Heckman’s method. 
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Given the data we have available, i.e. the original SISBEN database from 1993, and the 
later Familias survey from 2001, we can attempt a correction for sample selection in some 
of our specifications. We have the original household population from which the Familias 
sample was drawn: the SISBEN register. This is a c20,000 household register of all 
beneficiaries of the national welfare system, which are in the lowest income stratum, 
‘SISBEN 1’. The dataset identifies some basic characteristics, such as age, gender and 
education. However, information on these is missing for about half of the households. 
We can identify, which people stayed in and which left the original SISBEN population 
by comparing the households in the SISBEN sample with those in the Familias sample. 
Although Familias and SISBEN do not share the same household identifier, we can link 
the households up via the National ID number of the head. (A National ID number is 
unique and stays with the bearer for life, no matter where they move. That means, those 
SISBEN households which we no longer find in Familias did not just move from one 
place to another within the same sample. They are definitely not picked up anywhere in 
the Familias sample.) 
The SISBEN register can be merged at the municipality level with some municipal 
variables from before 2000. This includes violence data on armed group and common 
delinquency actions. It also contains some municipality level wealth indicators for various 
years. We include the sum of all bank assets per head in the municipality.  Although the 
above data is obviously limited, we can use it to attempt a sample selection correction. 
We can model the selection process according to Heckman and calculate the IMRs. This 
will allow us to correct the linear approaches and linear approximations in our work. 
However, we cannot control for selection in the non-linear specifications. This is because 
we cannot calculate the stratification weights in the original population which are needed 
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for the approaches for Boyes et al (1989) and Greene (1992). This is because the 
variables in the SISBEN sample are not the same as in Familias, and very rudimentary. 
We estimate the equation for z in the basic Heckman model explained above, taking 
‘migration out of the SISBEN population’ as dependent variable. Given the limitations 
of the SISBEN register, we are somewhat restricted in the choice of possible out-
migration determinants. Including household level variables would reduce the sample too 
much, so that we have to rely on municipality level characteristics alone. We include pre-
2000 data on the number of guerrilla fighters, landmine incidents, kidnappings and the 
homicide rate as right hand side variables. We also include the sum of all bank assets per 
head as an attempt to proxy for wealth at the municipality level. We include a squared 
term of each variable in order to be less restrictive in the functional form. The results are 
given below. 
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Dependent Variable  Coefficient  z-statistic
Migration out of the SISBEN sample
municipality level variables
no of guerrilleros  0.00002 -                        * 1.49 -              
no of guerrilleros²  2.24E-11 0.30               
landmine incidents  0.562 -                            0.45 -              
landmine incidents²  0.831                             0.95               
kidnappings 0.107                             1.05               
kidnappings² 0.009 -                            * 1.53 -              
homicide rate  0.055                             * 1.48               
homicide rate²  0.001 -                            1.28 -              
capitalisation/head -2.58E-06 1.34 -              
capitalisation/head² 4.31E-12 * 1.73               
constant 0.581 -                            *** 3.29 -              
F-test violence var (p value) 0.01                              
Pseudo R² 0.17
Log pseudo likelihood 6,208.72 -                      
Number of obs   11,380  
Results-Table 1: Estimation of the determinants of drop-out out of the SISBEN sample
24 
Note: The regression presents the Probit coefficients of available past violence, and welfare indicators on the probability 
to leave the SISBEN sample. Stars mark significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% or lower (***) levels. Regressions 
are with robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on municipality. The F-test examines joint significance of the 
violence variables. 
A higher number of guerrilleros appears to reduce emigration, while kidnappings and 
homicides encourage it until a certain level. People from very poor, as well as from very 
wealthy municipalities, as measured by the bank assets per head, seem to emigrate more. 
When interpreting the results, we need to remember that various motives can prompt 
emigration. Displacement through violence is only one of them; improvements in wealth, 
‘upgrading’ from one neighborhood to the next is also common. To the extent that our 
limited data reflects both motivations, we observe out-migration rising with kidnappings 
                                                 
24   The drop in observations is due to an imperfect merge with the Familias dataset. We merge with the National 
ID number of the household head, which is not reported for all households.  
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and the homicide rate (the turning points of the parables are at the very upper end of our 
sample) on the one hand, and declining with a higher number of guerrilleros and 
intermediate wealth levels on the other hand. From this regression, we calculate the 
IMRs. Note these are only identified at the municipality level as all our right hand side 
variables are measured at the municipality level. We will include the IMR in all linear 
empirical specifications. 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Our task is to measure the impact of the two kinds of violence endemic in Colombia, 
guerrilla warfare and common delinquency, on a household’s portfolio. In this context, 
any empirical specification has to consider three fundamental issues: the randomness of 
violence, the potential endogeneity of violence and the randomness of the sample.  
First, violence, whether perpetrated by the paramilitaries, guerrilla or by street gangs, 
cannot be assumed to be a natural experiment ex ante. Rather, different municipalities 
face different risks of victimization. But controlling for potential drivers of victimization 
can deliver a natural experiment within groups. We can think of the incidence of violence 
in our framework as a treatment effects model in the sense of Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), where the households are ‘treated’ with violence in different degrees, or not. To 
put it formally, the household’s response R depends on their dose of violence V, control 
variables  C  (at both household and municipality levels) and a random error 
term,
25 β β β ε + + + = C V R
                                                
2 1 0 .  
Clearly, in our context violence is not assigned randomly. Some municipalities are at 
higher risk of violence than others, because of certain characteristics such as geographical 
 
25   For ease of diction, here we abstract from indicating individual and community levels. 
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accessibility. However, in line with Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) we make the 
assumption that violence assignment is strongly ignorable if we control for the covariates 
that determine its assignment. Formally,  ( ) ( ) C E V C E ε ε = ,  where C is a matrix of 
control variables that are relevant for incidence of violence.
26 In other words, if we 
control for the groups with different risks of victimization, violence is a natural 
experiment within group. For our empirical approach, we assume that the controls we 
have identified exhaustively control for the assignment of violence and deliver the 
needed randomization within group. This assumption can be extended to the response R. 
For ease of diction let us assume there are only two states of violence, yes/no; and R
1 the 
response of the household with violence, and R
0  without. Then also 
( ) ( ) C R E V C R E , =
1 1  and  ( ) ( ) C R E V C R E , =
0 0
                                                
. Treatment assignment V and 
average response (R
1, R
0) are conditionally mean independent, given C. The role of the 
relevant covariates C is to ‘match’ those treated and not treated, in order to identify the 
effect of violence on the household response.
27 It is important that none of the control 
variables are caused directly by violence, because this would take away from the ‘pure 
effect’ in the coefficient on the violence variables. When specifying our approach below, 
we discuss for each selected variable why it fulfils this criterion.
28 
Second, it is worth discussing whether, in the studied context, violence could be 
considered endogenous, in the sense that particular assets or asset constellations attract 
certain types of violence. This point could perhaps be made in the context of richer 
 
26   The controls need to be at the level where violence is measured, so in our case, at the municipality level. 
27   Other papers using the matching assumption for identification are for example Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
(1997) and Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen (2004). In this context, the matching covariates are 
not given a causal interpretation for the household behaviour; nonetheless their association with the outcomes 
will be interesting to observe. 
28   However, including variables that are potentially endogenous to the response (but not violence) will not bias 
the coefficients on the violence variables, as long as the assumption of conditional independence holds. 
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households: there is evidence that absolute wealth levels attract certain types of crime.
29 
However, the households in our sample come from the lowest strata of the Colombian 
income distribution and are unlikely to be targeted specifically because of their asset 
constellation. Further, there is no evidence that specific portfolio shares of certain assets 
attract crime. Third, we have to take into account that displacement and migration 
influence the household portfolios observed in a region. It is conceivable that people 
adjust their portfolio in order to migrate, and still hold a skewed portfolio once they 
reached the peaceful area. We therefore correct for potential sample selection by 
including the Inverted Mills Ratios calculated from the underlying SISBEN register. 
For the actual choice of an econometric specification, we propose using various 
approaches to test the sensitivity of our predictions. Translating our model directly into a 
specification would suggest testing simultaneous OLS regressions of valued asset stocks 
on violence variables and controls. Given that many assets will be debt financed, it would 
also make sense to include the demand for debt as a third regression. We test this 
approach below in section A). Further, our model included a message about the share of 
fixed vs. mobile assets in the overall portfolio, which we examine through a Tobit in 
section B). Finally, our bi-variate analyses revealed an interesting dynamic at the very 
poorest fringe of the population. The mere participation in the two kinds of assets 
appeared to respond to violence. We therefore test this in section C) below.  
A) Valued asset demands 
We estimate the absolute asset demands, and the demand for debt (mortgage + cash 
debt) with a seemingly unrelated regression model. A seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) system is a set of regressions which seem to be unrelated, but which have 
                                                 
29   Gaviria and Pages (1999) and Gaviria and Vélez (2001). 
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contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation. The SUR estimator therefore allows 
the error matrix U  to be normally distributed  ) , 0 ( ~ Σ N U Σ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( + × + m m
 where   is a 
 singular covariance matrix
30. The equations we estimate are 
in n n n in in
in n n n in in
in n n n in in
V C X D
V C X M
u v V C X F
η κ λ θ μ
ε ω ϕ φ ι
δ γ β
+ + + + =
+ + + + =
+ + + + =
 
where F and M are valued holdings of fixed and mobile assets, respectively, and D is 
mortgage plus cash debt. Given our data, we need to measure stocks rather than flows of 
assets. We test both definitions of fixed assets, as discussed in Table 2 and Table 3, in 
order to ensure robustness. X is a matrix of the characteristics of household i in village n, 
including household head characteristics (education, age, gender and marital status) and a 
constant term. C is a matrix with community level indicators, including geographic 
variables
31 such as the region, the degree of sparseness of settlement, and the altitude; 
further proxies for poverty and inequality: the Index for Quality of Life and the 
percentage of people in the lowest two income strata, and, as a proxy of law and order, 
the capture rate under the Drug Act.
32  Note that both household and community level 
controls are not given a causal interpretation under our framework, but they fulfill a 
‘matching’ function for comparable communities and comparable households. 
V is a matrix of violence variables including a public order problem dummy (=guerrilla 
or paramilitary presence), guerrilla attacks and homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, v 
                                                 
30   We use the stata estimator suest which combines the estimation results (parameter-estimates and associated 
(co)variance matrices) stored from previous separate regressions into a single parameter-vector and 
simultaneous (co)variance matrix of the sandwich/robust type.  This (co)variance matrix is appropriate even if 
the estimates where obtained on the same or overlapping data. 
31   See Vargas, Restrepo and Spagat (2004). 
32   See Martínez and Medina (2003) and Martínez, Medina and Steiner (2001). 
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respectively  ω  and κ  are random village level factors; and u ,  ε and η  are individual 
level error terms, with  [] 0 , = X u E in in ε ,  [ ]
2
ε σ ε = X Var in ,  [ ]
2
in X = u σ u Var ; and  
[] 0 , = X v E n n ω ,  []
2
v n X v Var σ = ,  [ ]
2
ω σ ω = X Var n  and likewise for the relation 
between the assets and D.  
Also,  [ ]
2 , ω σ ϑ ϑ = jn in Cov  where  in n in ε ω ϑ + = ;  [ ]
2 , v jn in Cov σ υ υ =  where  in n in u v + = υ  
and [ ]
2 , κ σ ξ ξ = jn in Cov  where  in n in η κ ξ + = . We allow for this latter correlation of 
household error terms at the village level with clustering. - Note that the capture rate is 
measured at the departmental level. We can assume that individual errors, although 
correlated at the municipal level, are not correlated at the departmental level beyond 
municipalities (the average ‘Departamento’ stretches across c500km). Under this 
assumption standard errors clustered at the municipal level only are still valid. With SUR, 
also  [ ] 0 , ≠ u Cov ε ,  [ ] 0 , ≠ η ε Cov  and  [ ] 0 , ≠ η u Cov  as explained above.  
We estimate the equations with OLS, controlling each time for sample selection by 
including the Inverted Mills Ratio calculated from the SISBEN sample. Results-Table 2 
shows the results. 
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 Coeff   z-stat   Coeff   z-stat   Coeff   z-stat   Coeff   z-stat   Coeff 
Dependent Variable Fixed Assets Mobile Assets Debt
Violence
public order problem 638,513 -               * 1.47 -      724,637 -          * 1.81 -     154,496              ** 2.32      126,481            ** 2.31 131,352 -            
guerrilla attack rate 6,186                    0.11       6,649 -              0.14 -     1,722                  0.22      21,997              0.54 13,087               
homicide rate 3,854                    1.34       3,512               1.30      601 -                    1.43 -     848                   -0.78 501 -                   
Municipality controls
grouped settlement 35,373 -                 0.12 -      599,277 -          ** 2.42 -     48,789                0.79      116,764            *** 4.85 23,267 -              
rural sparse settlement 617,101 -               1.17 -      739,554 -          * 1.46 -     54,514                0.56      123,856            1.38 29,764               
Oriental Region 2,406,933             *** 3.45       1,936,905        *** 3.16      27,679 -               0.25 -     217,592            * 1.83 241,508              **
Central Region 1,748,623             ** 2.35       1,826,948        *** 2.59      471,512              *** 4.64      173,312            ** 2.37 235,482             
Pacific Region 168,410                0.33       378,194           0.75      102,217              1.19      124,770            -0.63 151,905 -            
altitude 272 -                      0.27 -      179 -                 0.19 -     237 -                    * 1.63 -     245                   * -1.67 111                    
altitude² 0                           0.33       0                      0.30      0                         1.33      0                       1.09 0                        
percentage of people in lowest two strata 528,271 -               0.49 -      190,712 -          0.19 -     316,483              * 1.93      307,492            0.01 176,605             
index of quality of life 2,150 -                   0.03 -      11,345             0.19      5,205                  0.49      17,498              -0.47 12,388 -              
capture rate 503                       1.20       568                  1.40      95 -                      1.22 -     122                   -1.31 66                      
Household/ head variables
age 80,142                  1.35       68,621             1.26      22,616                *** 2.69      15,283              *** 2.71 43,961                ***
age2 294                       0.47       350                  0.61      220 -                    *** 2.69 -     147                   ** -2.34 405 -                    ***
married 944,904                *** 3.80       840,481           *** 3.58      97,920                * 1.81      89,772              ** 2.04 430,584              ***
female 349,135 -               * 1.55 -      100,430 -          0.47 -     245,439 -             *** 5.61 -     68,722              *** -6.75 69,438 -               *
some or complete primary education 204,025 -               1.07 -      163,390 -          0.93 -     85,817                ** 1.98      88,340              0.55 73,021                *
some secondary or more education 704,969                ** 2.22       631,702           ** 2.09      427,190              *** 4.34      128,194            *** 3.87 548,460              ***
Inverted Mills Ratio 3,853,922 -            * 1.69 -      2,900,246 -       1.32 -     627,837              0.65      1,294,539         -0.18 1,159,224 -          ***
constant 5,426,227             1.34       3,440,779        0.85      1,386,398 -          0.91 -     2,036,264         0.13 1,213,651           **
Wald test Inverted Mills Ratio (p value)   0.10 0.19 0.52                    0.86 0
Wald test violence variables (p value)   0.38 0.26 0.12                    0.12 0.39
Wald test welfare indicators (p value)   0.89 0.95 0.16                    0.89 0.48
Wald test access of the state (p value) 0 0 0.0001              0 0.001
Adj R² 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
Number of obs 7,248                    7468 7410 7,202                7,439                 
Fixed asset definition (1) Fixed asset definition (2) Fixed asset definition (1) Fixed asset definition (2)
 
Results-Table 2: Coefficient estimates from a seemingly unrelated regression of fixed and mobile 
assets and the debt of Colombian households 
Note: Dependent variables are valued fixed assets, valued mobile assets, and debt, respectively.  The first and the third 
columns use the asset definition (1) of Table 2, the second and the fourth asset definition (2) of Table 3. Regressions are 
OLS, in a SUR system. Standard errors are robust, adjusted for clustering on municipality. 
Default household education level is ‘none’. Default region is Atlantic, default rurality degree is ‘urban’. Stars mark 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.  
The Wald-tests (chi²) examine joint significance of groups of variables, in this order of the violence variables: public order 
problem, attack rate, homicide rate; of the welfare indicators: the index of quality of life and the share of population in the 
lowest two income sixtiles; of the variables indicating access of the state: rurality, region, altitude, and capture rate, 
respectively. 
 
The results largely confirm our conceptual framework, and are qualitatively robust to 
different asset definitions.
33 In the regressions for fixed and mobile assets, all violence 
variables have the sign predicted by our model, irrespective of the asset specification 
                                                 
33    They are also robust to excluding municipalities with very high violence levels as outliers, and different 
specifications, including consumption and employment status at the household level or excluding the capture 
rate (results not shown). 
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chosen. Significance varies. The incidence of a public order problem is significant at the 
5% level for mobile assets, and at the 10% level for fixed assets. The lower significance 
for fixed assets may result from our data not measuring their value very precisely, 
especially for real estate, which respondents were asked to estimate. The homicide rate is 
just below significance for both assets. The attack rate is not significant.  None of the 
violence variables is significant for the demand of debt, as far as we can measure it.  
Regarding the municipality controls, we observe that only the regional dummies matter 
for all three demands. The Oriental and Central regions witness a significantly higher 
ownership of fixed assets, as would be expected. The other regions, Atlantic (default) and 
Pacific, are both poorer and geographically less accessible, thereby more vulnerable to 
rebel violence. For mobile assets, only the most accessible Central region shows higher 
investments. The capture rate is never fully significant for either asset or debt. However, 
the geographic variables and the capture rate together, proxying the access of the state to 
the municipality, are jointly highly significant in each regression, with p-values of near 0. 
Variables describing the household paint a consistent picture. Age is associated with 
mobile assets and debt, showing an inverted U shape, which is consistent with the 
lifecycle-hump sometimes observed in both consumption and saving.
34  Judging from the 
coefficients on the household variables, debt is treated like a third asset. This may reflect 
that the households in Familias were more inclined to report official rather than informal 
debts, although they were asked about both, or that the level of debt primarily reflects 
creditworthiness. We observe higher debt for married household heads and lower for 
female heads. We further observe more education entails a higher debt, with secondary 
                                                 
34   See for example Bütler (1997) for a comprehensive overview of empirical patterns of lifecycle decision-making 
on consumption and savings. 
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or higher education showing a much larger coefficient and more significance (1% level) 
than primary education (10% level).  
We correct for sample selection with the Inverted Mills Ratio and find it marginally 
significant for fixed assets, and highly significant for debt. (The signs, negative 
throughout, have to be interpreted as their opposite, as we modeled the selection 
equation on leaving the base sample rather than being selected into the Familias sample.) 
There appears to be a correlation between the unobserved variables that influence the 
probability of staying on and the unobserved variables influencing investment in fixed 
assets and drawing of debt. The coefficients on the Inverse Mills ratios suggest that the 
factors that cause individuals to stay bias upward the investment in fixed assets and 
especially the drawing of debt. This makes sense in the context of our results. It is likely 
that the people who left were poorer in ways we cannot measure. Fixed assets and debt 
are more likely to be found in the possession of stayers rather than leavers. 
We next explore how the share of fixed assets in the portfolio responds to different 
kinds of violence. 
B) Portfolio shares for fixed and mobile assets 
We estimate the choice of portfolio shares with a Tobit. This tests the actual portfolio 
composition and should pick up movements from fixed to mobile. We exclude debt. We 
estimate only one equation, as the share of one asset simultaneously determines the share 
of the other. The model reads 
in n n n in u v V C X SF
in + + + + = δ γ β
*  
*
in in SF SF =  if   if  ;   if  . 
l u l
in in in in in SF SF SF SF SF = ≤ ≤ ;
* l
in in SF SF <
* u
in in SF SF =
u
in in SF SF >
*
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where SF is the share of fixed assets in the entire portfolio, and the other variables as in 
the previous regression. Likewise,  [ ] 0 = X u E in ,  [ ]
2
u in X u Var σ = ;  [] 0 = X v E n , 
[]
2
v n X v Var σ =  and  [ ]
2 , v jn in Cov σ υ υ =  where  in n in u v + = υ .   
We estimate two econometric models, one as outlined above, and one approximating the 
Tobit with an OLS. The OLS regression includes Inverted Mills Ratios to control for 
sample selection. As before, we also test the sensitivity of our specification by excluding 
consumption and employment status. Results-Table 3 shows the results.  
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Dependent Variable  Coefficient   z-statistic   Coefficient   z-statistic   Coefficient   z-statistic   Coefficient   z-statistic 
Share of fixed assets
Violence
public order problem 0.044 -                    *** 4.22 -              0.048 -                    *** 3.09 -                0.040 -                     ** -2.14 0.039 -                    * -1.54
guerrilla attack rate 0.001 -                    0.46 -              0.005 -                    ** 2.19 -                0.001 -                     -0.28 0.004 -                    -1.38
homicide rate 0.0004                   *** 4.21               0.0005                   *** 3.95                 0.0003                    *** 2.90              0.0004                   ** 2.16
Municipality controls
grouped settlement 0.040 -                    *** 3.88 -              0.101 -                    *** 6.70 -                0.033 -                     ** -2.34 0.074 -                    *** -4.52
rural sparse settlement 0.004 -                    0.29 -              0.024 -                    1.06 -                0.003 -                     -0.14 0.031 -                    -1.17
Oriental Region 0.029                     * 1.90               0.050                     ** 2.23                 0.033                      1.43 0.038                     1.06
Central Region 0.02                       1.29               0.14                       *** 5.81                 0.02                        0.46 0.10                       * 1.77
Pacific Region 0.014 -                    0.70 -              0.087                     *** 3.06                 0.011 -                     -0.36 0.064                     * 1.68
altitude 2.13E-06 0.09               -1.12E-04 *** 3.04 -                -2.84E-06 -0.06 -7.22E-05 -1.22
altitude² 2.64E-09 0.26               3.08E-08 ** 2.04                 3.29E-09 0.19 1.96E-08 0.89
percentage of people in lowest two strata 0.010                     0.40               0.076                     ** 2.11                 0.000                      0.01 0.053                     0.98
index of quality of life 0.005 -                    ** 2.33 -              0.004 -                    1.36 -                0.005 -                     -1.44 0.003 -                    -0.71
capture rate 1.96E-05 * 1.65               3.47E-06 0.20                 1.92E-05 0.98 1.68E-06 0.06
Household/ head variables
age 0.013                     *** 6.29               0.021                     *** 6.90                 0.011                      *** 7.02 0.013                     *** 6.66
age2 0.0001 -                  *** 3.63 -              0.0001 -                  *** 3.92 -                0.0001 -                   *** -4.26 0.0001 -                  *** -3.32
married 0.053                     *** 5.53               0.083                     *** 5.85                 0.052                      *** 5.37 0.057                     *** 4.78
female 0.031                     *** 2.80               0.059                     *** 3.61                 0.028                      *** 2.52 0.049                     *** 3.89
some or complete primary education 0.010 -                    0.98 -              0.014 -                    0.93 -                0.008 -                     -0.81 0.015 -                    -1.17
some secondary or more education 0.005 -                    0.34 -              0.028 -                    1.31 -                0.003 -                     -0.23 0.037 -                    * -1.92
Inverted Mills Ratio 0.1226 -                   0.62 -             0.022                     0.09             
constant 0.405                     *** 5.20               0.152 -                    1.32 -                0.640                      2.08 0.108                     0.29
Replications 50                          50                         
Clusters 78                          78                         
  Wald test Inverted Mills Ratio (p value)   0.53 0.93                      
  Wald test violence variables (p value)   0.01 0.06                      
  Wald test welfare indicators (p value)   0.35 0.46                      
Wald test access of the state (p value) 0.13 0.0002
Adj R² 0.07 0.08
Number of obs 7099 7099 7072 7072
Tobit OLS
Fixed assets definition (1) Fixed assets definition (2) Fixed assets definition (1) Fixed assets definition (2)
 
Results-Table 3: Regression of the share of fixed assets in the portfolio of Colombian 
households 
Note: Dependent variable is the share (%) of fixed assets in the household portfolio. The first and the third columns use 
the asset definition (1) of Table 2, the second and the fourth asset definition (2) of Table 3. The first two columns report 
on a bootstrapped Tobit specification, the last two on an OLS approximation of the Tobit. Regressions are with robust 
standard errors, adjusted for clustering on municipality. 
Default household education level is ‘none’. Default region is Atlantic, default rurality degree is ‘urban’. Stars mark 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.  
The Wald tests (F-tests) examine joint significance of groups of variables, in this order of the violence variables: public 
order problem, attack rate, homicide rate; of the welfare indicators: the index of quality of life and the share of population 
in the lowest two income sixtiles; of the variables indicating access of the state: rurality, region, altitude, and capture rate, 
respectively. 
The results confirm the predictions of our model, and are consistent with the results of 
the simultaneous regressions above. A public order problem, signaling that guerrillas or 
paramilitaries are present in the municipality, significantly reduces the share of fixed 
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assets in a household’s portfolio, whereas the homicide rate, a proxy for common 
delinquency, increases it. These results are robust to the econometric model (Tobit or 
OLS) and the asset definition (fixed assets only including house, land and fridge 
(definition 2) or also heavy animals and machinery (definition 1)).
35  Additionally, the 
guerrilla attack rate tends to decrease the share of fixed assets, but this result is not 
significant under asset definition (1). The violence variables are jointly significant. 
At the municipality level, we observe that the Oriental and Central Region tend to have a 
positive association with the fixed share; however, the significance varies with the asset 
specification. The capture rate is usually insignificant, it only becomes marginally positive 
significant for the broader asset definition.  
Variables describing the household behave largely as expected. Age shows a lifecycle 
hump, and married household heads have a higher share of fixed assets.  Female heads, 
however, are also associated with a higher share of fixed assets. A possible explanation 
could be a male partner having left the household and taken some mobile assets with him 
- an avenue for future research to explore. Any education is seen with a lower share of 
fixed assets (a higher share of mobile ones), which may be due to the fact that fixed 
assets are related to farming enterprises, requiring less formal education than the service 
activities frequently undertaken by SISBEN 1 and 2 households (e.g. catering). 
The OLS regression allows us to test for sample selection. We observe that the Inverted 
Mills Ratio is insignificant for each asset specification, p-values of a Wald test are 0.53 
and 0.98 respectively. The selection effects observed for the SUR regression cancel 
themselves out when a ratio of fixed and total assets is observed.  Our final section 
explores the participation in the two kinds of assets. 
                                                 
35   We have also tested different specifications (excluding the capture rate or including employment status or total 
consumption) and excluding municipalities with very high violence levels and found our results robust. 
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C) Bi-variate Probit 
An econometric analysis of household portfolios has to take into account that many 
households do not hold certain asset categories at all. Further, the decision process to 
hold assets may be different from the choice of shares.
36 Given the context we are 
studying, it is possible that households focus on whether to hold assets rather than 
choosing their respective portfolio shares. This is especially true for the poorest fringe of 
the population. From the bi-variate analyses we have seen that only about 10% of people 
do not hold both assets, with 3% holding none. - A bi-variate probit in this context picks 
up the responsiveness of the poorest to violent threats. Note, however, that this 
empirical set-up only measures participation without valuing the assets, and therefore 
misses a lot of the investment dynamic. Nonetheless, it may offer some hints as to 
whether the poorest react differently. 
The estimated model reads: 
()
() in n n n in in
in n n n in in
V C X M P
u v V C X F P
ε ω ι φ ϕ
δ γ β
+ + + + Φ = >




where F and M are =1 if the household participates in fixed and mobile assets, 
respectively and 0 otherwise, and the other controls as before. v respectively ω  is a 
random village level factor; and u and ε  are at the individual level correlated error terms. 
[] 0 , = X u E in in ε ,  []
2
ε σ ε = X Var in ,  [ ]
2
u in X u Var σ = ; and  [] 0 , = X v E n n ω , 
[ ] []
2
v n X v Var σ = ,  []
2
ω σ ω = X Var n , as well as 
2 , ω σ ϑ ϑ = jn in Cov    where  in n in ε ω ϑ + = , 
and  [ ]
2 , v jn in Cov σ υ υ =    where  in n in u v + = υ . We allow for this latter correlation of 
                                                 
36   Also see Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 2002 
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household error terms by clustering. Using a bi-variate probit we assume also 
[] u Cov u ρ σ σ ε ε













rcentage of people in lowest two strata







me or complete primary education
me secondary or more education
nstant
= ,  as explained above. 
We estimate the above model for both asset specifications. Note, that in this non-linear 
approach we cannot control for sample selection, because we do not have the 
proportions of asset choice in the underlying SISBEN population (cf. Boyes, Hoffman 
and Low (1989)). Results-Table 4 presents the regression results and the following table 
summarizes marginal effects. 
Depend Fixed Assets Mobile Assets Fixed Assets Mobile Assets
 Coefficient   z-statistic  Coefficient  z-statistic Coefficient  z-statistic   Coefficient  z-statistic
Viol
pu 0.120 -                 -1.31 0.063                  0.55 0.140 -                 -1.41 0.120                  0.90              
gu 0.036                  ** 2.02 0.020                  ** 1.97 0.016                  * 1.59 0.018                  * 1.54              
ho 0.0001                0.11 0.0011 -               ** 2.00 -            0.0009                * 1.61 0.0005 -               0.80 -             
Muni
gr 0.423                  *** 3.67 0.415                  *** 4.17 0.174 -                 ** -1.98 0.295                  *** 2.58              
ru 0.451                  *** 3.15 0.295                  *** 2.97 0.045 -                 -0.29 0.131                  1.06              
O 0.091                  0.58 0.166 -                 -1.22 0.222                  * 1.56 0.194 -                 1.16 -             
Cen 0.176                  1.31 0.086 -                 -0.63 0.458                  ** 2.21 0.091                  0.50              
P 0.210                  1.08 0.108                  0.58 0.414                  ** 2.04 0.323                  1.36              
al -1.77E-04 -0.72 -6.35E-04 *** -2.89 -2.36E-04 -0.98 -4.04E-04 * 1.50 -             
al 8.34E-08 0.75 2.57E-07 *** 3.26 1.68E-08 0.20 1.78E-07 * 1.83              
pe 0.009 -                 -0.04 0.240 -                 -0.97 0.158 -                 -0.68 0.235 -                 0.90 -             
i 0.036 -                 ** -2.09 0.034 -                 * -1.50 0.025 -                 -1.44 0.016 -                 0.62 -             
ca 2.60E-05 0.24 -3.28E-05 -0.25 -4.58E-05 -0.33 -1.26E-04 0.83 -             
Hous
ag 0.046                  *** 2.79 0.042                  *** 2.84 0.042                  *** 4.10                0.041                  ** 2.06              
ag 0.0002 -               -1.12 0.0003 -               ** -2.25 0.0002 -               * 1.45 -               0.0003 -               * 1.65 -             
m 0.052                  0.5 0.255                  *** 2.67 0.249                  *** 4.69                0.271                  ** 2.23              
fe 0.365 -                 *** -5.14 0.357 -                 *** -4.84 0.012                  0.23                0.389 -                 *** 4.90 -             
so 0.009 -                 -0.1 0.068                  1 0.020                  0.32                0.156                  ** 2.08              
so 0.090                  0.95 0.324                  *** 3.09 0.086                  0.93                0.512                  *** 3.68              
co 0.981                  * 1.35 1.550                  ** 1.94 0.076 -                 -0.14 1.139                  1.15






Lo 2,674.48 -            -5153.02
7500 7500
Fixed asset definition (1) Fixed asset definition (2)
  ald tests 
olence variables (p value)  
elfare indicators (p value)  
ccess of the state (p value)
g pseudo likelihood
Number of obs
Results-Table 4: Coefficient estimates from bi-variate Probit model of ownership of fixed and 
mobile assets of Colombian households 
Note: Dependent variables are the participation in fixed assets, and mobile assets, respectively.  The first and the second 
columns use the asset definition (1) of Table 2, the third and the fourth asset definition (2) of Table 3. Regressions are 
Probit, allowing for individual error correlation across the two decisions. Standard errors are robust, adjusted for 
clustering on municipality. 
Default household education level is ‘none’. Default region is Atlantic, default rurality degree is ‘urban’. Stars mark 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.  
The Wald tests (chi²) examine joint significance of groups of variables in both specifications, in this order of the violence 
variables: public order problem, attack rate, homicide rate; of the welfare indicators: the index of quality of life and the 
share of population in the lowest two income sixtiles; of the variables indicating access of the state: rurality, region, 
altitude, and capture rate, respectively. 
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Pr(F=1,M=1) 0.94 Pr(F=1,M=0) 0.03             Pr(F=0,M=1) 0.02              
dy/dx X dy/dx X dy/dx X
Violence
public order problem -0.002 0.71                             -0.007 0.71               0.007 0.71              
guerrilla attack rate 0.003 1.46                             -0.001 1.46               -0.002 1.46              
homicide rate -7.10E-05 51.81                           7.56E-05 51.81             -2.08E-05 51.81            
Municipality controls
grouped settlement 0.048 0.37                             -0.020 0.37               -0.015 0.37              
rural sparse settlement 0.035 0.09                             -0.011 0.09               -0.015 0.09              
Oriental Region -0.008 0.25                             0.015 0.25               -0.007 0.25              
Central Region 0.002 0.16                             0.010 0.16               -0.010 0.16              
Pacific Region 0.017 0.06                             -0.004 0.06               -0.008 0.06              
altitude -5.43E-05 466.97                         4.13E-05 466.97           -6.21E-07 466.97          
altitude² 2.26E-08 633,344.00                  -1.65E-08 633,344.00    -3.95E-10 633,344.00   
percentage of people in lowest two strata -0.017 0.64                             0.017 0.64               -0.003 0.64              
index of quality of life -0.004 25.81                           0.002 25.81             0.001 25.81            
capture rate -8.71E-07 458.61                         2.78E-06 458.61           -1.97E-06 458.61          
Household/ head variables
age 0.005 45.38                           -0.002 45.38             -0.002 45.38            
age² -3.44E-05 2,227.94                      1.97E-05 2,227.94        5.59E-06 2,227.94       
married 0.019 0.28                             -0.015 0.28               0.001 0.28              
female -0.052 0.26                             0.020 0.26               0.016 0.26              
some or complete primary education 0.004 0.54                             -0.005 0.54               0.002 0.54              
some secondary or more education 0.023 0.14                             -0.017 0.14               -2.11E-04 0.14              
Results-Table 5: Marginal effects after bi-variate Probit on holdings of fixed and mobile assets, 
definition (1) of fixed assets 
Note: Table reports the marginal effects after the regression in the previous Table. Dependent variables are the 
participation in fixed assets, and mobile assets, respectively, using the asset definition (1) of Table 2.  
Default household education level is ‘none’, default employment ‘none or domestic worker’. Default region is Atlantic, 
default rurality degree is ‘urban’.  
For qualitative variables, dy/dx marks the percentage increase in participation after a discrete change from the default 
situation. 
 
The dynamics are largely the same as observed previously, but we note some differences 
when the mere participation in assets, is considered.  The public order dummy continues 
to have the sign predicted by our model, but stays below significance in every 
specification. Also the coefficient on the homicide rate behaves as predicted, but with 
varying significance. It reduces the participation in mobile assets (significant for 
definition (1)), and increases fixed participation (significant for definition (2)). The signs 
are robust to the asset definition, and can be shown robust to different combinations of 
control variables. All violence variables are jointly significant for both asset definitions. 
The guerrilla attack rate now shows a new effect. More guerrilla attacks seem to make it 
more likely that people participate in both assets at all, independent of the asset 
definition. Given that the result is more pronounced for the broader definition, it could 
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result from guerrilla actions still serving some redistributive motive for the poorest 
fringe. Another possible explanation is that the poorest profit from abandoned property 
in the presence of an attack on law and order. Note however that this regression only 
looks at participation (yes/no) and not values, and therefore captures only the behavior 
of a very small fraction of the households we are looking at.  
Correlation of error terms: The ρ’s 
The ρ’s reported at the bottom of Results-Table 4 indicate the correlation between the 
individual error terms of both probits. We see that the errors are strongly and 
significantly correlated. We would expect this result to be picking up omitted variables in 
the decision for fixed and mobile assets, such as ability, regional traditions etc. 
Idiosyncratic measurement error in the survey is another possibility. Other things equal, 
people with fixed assets are also likely to have mobile assets. So, the ρ may be picking up 
the complementarity between both kinds of assets. If you have a house, a mixer and 
other small household goods are useful. Likewise, if you have cattle, you might want to 
have a bike or motorbike to look after them.  
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper presented a theoretical model for investment in two kinds of assets, fixed and 
mobile, which predicted that the assets would react differently to different kinds of 
violence. Fixed assets would go down to the benefit of mobile assets in the presence of 
the guerrilla and paramilitaries, because they cannot be carried away in case of 
displacement – a favorite weapon of the aforementioned, and the reverse would happen 
in the presence of common delinquency, which is associated with theft. Empirical results 
from Colombian micro-data largely confirm this model. Tobit and OLS regressions 
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examining the share of fixed assets in the portfolio confirmed all findings with high 
significance, robust to different asset definitions and empirical specifications. A 
Seemingly Unrelated system of valued demands of the two assets and debt returned the 
expected signs on all violence variables, however with varying significance. Selection 
correction with the Inverted Mills Ratio showed that the sample of stayers captured in 
the survey data is more likely to hold value in both kinds of assets and debt than the base 
population but not a higher share of fixed assets. 
An investigation of mere participation in both assets, i.e. asset movements happening at 
the poorest fringe of the population, confirmed our model for the homicide rate, but 
brought the controversial finding that participation in both assets may rise with more 
guerrilla attacks. This raises the question of whether the guerrilla occasionally still 
engages in redistribution, or the poorest benefit from abandoned property. In any case, 
the analysis of participation should be taken with a grain of salt as it only registers the 
asset movements of about 10% of the population and has to work with small cell sizes.  
To the extent that violence falls under the definition of socio-political risk, our findings 
confirm Stewart and Venieris (1985). In general, however, our paper answers a new 
research question and to our knowledge the results have no parallels in the established 
literature. They add a violence perspective to a model of savings in two assets and show 
how violence can influence portfolio composition, skewing it to an economically sub-
optimal combination. Violence is shown to incentivize people to hedge against it. It 
would be interesting for future research to explore whether this effect can shift some 
fundamental parameters of a community or a country, such as the savings rate or risk 
aversion. Our results for portfolio choice suggest this may be likely.  
Some conclusions bear relevance to policy makers. First, both guerrilla and common 
violence have consequences that reach beyond their immediate destructive effect. The 
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mere threat of displacement (measured by the presence of paramilitaries or guerrillas) 
appears enough to skew portfolios to prepare for flight. An adequate policy response to 
violence should therefore not only focus on curbing it but also seek to attenuate people’s 
behavioral responses, e.g. by promoting savings and favoring certain kinds of assets, e.g. 
within an asset-based welfare program. Further, to the extent that the recurrent empirical 
importance of the Central Region in Colombia for investment in both types of assets 
reflects its better transport connections, this encourages enhancing accessibility, 
especially terrestrial, of areas; also in order to increase the presence of the state. This 
finding confirms various studies on the Colombian armed conflict, e.g. Rubio (1999b) 
and Sánchez et al. (2003).  
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